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This exercise in comparative measurement and anal~sis surveys 
indicators for labour and land productivities 1n European 
agricultures between 1890 and 1980. It exposes the empirical 
flaws and above all the range of conceptual difficulties involved 
in defining agricultural outputs and inputs for purposes of 
international comparison. Yet the numbers do reveal how the 
industrialization of continental economies was constrained (and 
severely constrained in Mediterranean Europe) compared with that 
of the UK by malign historical legacies of high ratios of labour 
to land and an unfavourable ecological environment for the 
diffusion of the animal intensive technology of the first 
agrarian revolution. 
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"Why isn't European history the history of a continent?", 
William Parker asked recently. He went on to affirm that "if the 
study of Europan economic history is going to be of any use or 
interest, ... it is going to have to have a different format", 
and must become "a history of transnational trends and 
development in which the political units were set". (1) Few 
economic historians of Europe would disagree because they are 
persuaded by the idea that international comparisons help towards 
a better understanding of both European and national patterns of 
industrialization. (2) The virtual abandonment of a British 
paradigm represents another step forward for comparative economic 
history particularly when countries that failed to experienced 
significant structural change before 1914 are included in the 
selection of cases studied in the context of European economic 
history.~) But progress in comparative history remains limited 
in coverage and scope. Most texts continue to embody little more 
than summaries of national economic histories, while older 
typologies which purport to include Europe as a whole in a 
unified and integrated frame of reference are regarded as 
unsatisfactory. (4) 
In order to measure and to explain the gap in levels of 
income per capita and output per worker across European 
countries, a larger and more secure data base is required, 
especially for agricUlture because early and successful examples 
of industrialization in Europe have been closely associated with 
improvements in the productivity of land, labour and capital 
employed in primary productions. Benign connections between high 
and increasing levels of agrarian productivity and the rise of 
an urban industrial economy are well understood. The problem now 
is to locate, measure and explain contrasts in the performance 
of national agricultures across Europe, first at a point in time 
and then through time. As a contribution to that discussion we 
purpose to estimate and analyse differences in the productivity 
of labour and land utilized by the agricUltural sectors of five 
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major European economies for a run of five years around 1910 and 
then to offer an account of the convergence and divergence in 
productivity levels between 1890 and 1980. Alas data available 
on agrarian capital formation is simply not adequate or accurate 
enough to compare levels and charges in total factor productivity 
and our analysis falls back on the range of possible inferences 
that might be drawn from the measurement and careful testing on 
partial productivity indicators. m. 
New benchmark estimates for the productivity of labour and 
land utilized in producing French, German, Italian, spanish and 
U.K. agricultural outputs have been constructed for years before 
the Great War. comparable estimates compiled by other scholars 
for that year and for benchmarks around 1930, 1960, 1970, 1975 
and 1980 have been used for two purposes: first to analyse trends[ towards convergence in agrarian productivity over time; secondly 
(and of equal importance) to expose the meaning, limitations and 
consistency of the range of estimates now available for the 
measurement of output per worker and yields per hectare across 
European agricultures. Many numbers appear in print purporting 
to represent partial productivity levels for agriculture (and 
also for industry). Their empirical validity needs to be properly 
established and their meaning carefully specified if we are to 
initiate discussions about contrasts in performance across Europe 
based upon a data base that analytical economic history can take 
to be reasonably secure.~ Thus, we propose: to present a new 
set of output and productivity estimates for 1910 in section II; 
to critically survey figures and methods published by other 
authors for the measurement of output and productivity for that 
same period (Section Ill); to discuss the historical inferences 
about European development that might be drawn both from cross 
country comparisons for 1910 and from longer term trends towards 
convergence in agrarian productivity from 1890 to 1980 (Section 
IV) • 
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II 
In order to estimate levels of agricultural output and 
productivity in comparable units of account across five European 
countries for years around 1910, we followed the procedures 
adopted and explained by van Ooststroom and Maddison and by 
O'Brien and Toniolo. m We began by constructing final 
agricultural outputs (final outputs which are measured in 
physical quantities produced net of seed, animal feed and 
~astage) for U.K., France, Germany, Italy and spain. Final 
outputs for most of the crops and animal products produced by all 
five national agricultures were multiplied by two sets of farm 
gate prices, or by 'shadow' prices wherever farm fate prices were 
not available. As a first step we derived estimates for aggregate 
final output of each nation's agriculture valued both in sterling 
and in the nation's own currency. 
Forestry is omitted because data is inadequate and 
manufactured dairy products (cheese and butter) were defined as 
industrial outputs and excluded from agricultural production. 
Farm products were assumed to be homogeneous and comparable 
across countries and variations in quality or fine differences 
in classification are thereby ignored. In theory and largely in 
practice the prices used to value physical outputs were prices 
paid to farmers. Where price quotations could not be traced 
shadow prices were constructed for particular crops (usually 
Mediterranean foodstuffs) by using Italian (and in some cases 
Spanish) price ratios relative to wheat. Occasionally import 
prices (net of freight, insurance and other distribution costs) 
also served as shadow process. (8) 
Sources for the U.K., France and Germany are those used by 
other scholars in European economic history, namely the original 
research of Ojala, Mitchell and Deane, Dewey, Toutain and 
Hoffmann.~ While the recent and still unpublished research of 
Federico and of simpson provided improved information for the 
outputs of Italy and Spain. (10) 
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For our second set of calculations designed to produce 
rather rough estimates of gross value added (i. e. the aggregated 
values of final outputs minus the values of the inputs of goods 
and services purchased from outside agriculture) we accepted the 
percentages offered by Vandel16s for Spain, Federico for Italy, 
Hoffmann et al. for Germany, Toutain for France, Ojala (cross 
checked against unpublished estimates by Kennedy) for U.K.uU 
In order to maintain consistency with other published 
estimates for labour productivity we have not followed the 
O'Brien and Toniolo procedures of defining the labour input in 
terms of fully employed male equivalent units of labour time. 
Their complex method attempted to eliminate man years of 
unemployment from census reports of labour available for works 
in agriculture and to convert the labour of the elderly and of 
women and children into male equivalents units of labour input. (12) 
Their theoretically preferable solution could not be adopted 
for multinational comparisons because of the inconsistencies 
discovered in reporting female agricultural workers by national 
population censuses and the research required to measure under 
and unemployment among agricultural work forces across Europe 
would be extremely difficult and possibly futile to undertake. 
Finally (outside Britain) the division of labour between 
agriculture, industry and services had still not proceeded far 
enough by 1910 to countervail a considerable (but unmeasurable) 
degree of arbitrary assignment of workers by census officials to 
single sectors of a rapidly evolving but still rather 
unspecialized structure of occupations.U~ For instance, it is 
possible to divide the working year of any given 'labourer' 
between time spent engaged in farming (agriculture), carting 
produce for sale in urban markets (services) and manufacturing 
clogs (industry). In practice the officials who recorded his 
occupations for a population census usually classified him in 
terms of his principal occupation -Le. as an agricultural 
labourer. U4) This implies that for economies with less refined 
.~_._-------------_._---------_. 
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divisions of labour (e.g. Spain and Italy compared with the U.K. 
and Germany) the estimates available in population censuses on[~ 
the size of work force engaged in agriculture are likely to be 
overstated and the figures for their labour productivities are 
understated. Our labour input figures refer either to males 
classified as employed in agriculture or to totals of 
economically active populations assigned to agriculture. Thus 
the figures depend heavily on population censuses with their all 
too familiar imperfections. (15) 
Measuring the input of land utilized to produce total 
agricultural outputs turns out to be even more problematical. 
Variations in quality for different kinds of soil contained 
within the boundaries of European states makes aggregation into 
hectares of cultivated land questionable. Although arable land 
may be more similar in quality than 'total agricultural land' 
which includes pastures, meadows, rough grazing and other types 
of land used to support animals and 'wild' fruit and nut trees. 
Some authors were prepared to make the assumption that arable 
land is homogeneous and transformed other land into arable 
equivalents, using unexplained conversion coefficients. This 
method is analogous to the conversion of 'other' workers into 
full time male equivalents adapted for the labour input by 
O'Brien and Toniolo. Alas we could not be satisfied that 
conversion ~oefficients (adopted by Moore and Dennison) could be 
validated empirically.(16) Futhermore, in mixed farming systems it 
is extremely difficult at the macro level to separate out the 
hectares of arable land used to feed livestock. We adopted a 
solution which also offered the advantage of allowing us to 
compare aggregated yields per hectare over time by using the 
estimates pUblished by other authors for 1930, 1960, 1970, 1975 
and 1980. Our land inputs (which rest upon standard F.A.O. 
definitions) refer: to total agricultural land which is an 
inclusive concept embodying arable land plus permanent pastures 
and meadows as well as rough and mountain grazing.(17) 
l_ 
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Table 1. Labour productivity in European Agriculture c. 1910 
(U.K. = 100) 
Gross 
Final outputs Values Added 
France OiL OILM OiL OILM 
1. Direct Estimates 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (U.K. prices) 58 86 76 114 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (French prices) 57 85 75 112 
Bairoch (calories) 72 
Van Zanden (wheat equivalents) 56 83 
O'Brien-Keyder (PPP) 67 
2.  Backward Extrapolations 
Moore (European crop units for 1930) 55 82 53 79 
Hayami Ruttan (international wheat equivalents for 1960) 52 
O'Brien- Prados de la Escosura (1960 US prices) 55 82 
Van der Meer and van Ark (1975 US prices) 74 
Prasada Rao (1975 international prices) 58 86 39 58 
Germany 
1. Direct Estimates 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (U.K. prices) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (German prices) 
Bairoch (calories) 
Van Zanden (wheat equivalents) 
Fremdling (PPP) 
56 
58 
77 
97 
100 
106 
133 
77 
79 
51 
134 
136 
2. Backward Extrapolations 
Moore (European crop units for 1930) 
Hayami Ruttan (international wheat equivalents for 1960) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (1960 US prices) 
Van der Meer and van Ark (1975 US prices) 
Prasada Rao (1975 international prices) 
71 
68 
76 
123 
74 
118 
132 
70 
118 
64 
122 
112 
Italy 
1. Direct Estimates 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (U.K. prices) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (Italian prices) 
O'Brien-Toniolo (U.K. prices) 
O'Brien-Toniolo (Italian prices) 
Bairoch (calories) 
Van Zanden (wheat equivalents) 
31 
30 
24 
47 
45 
43 
46 
28 
37 
43 
41 
65 
62 
60 
65 
2. Backward Extrapolations 
Moore (European crop units for 1930) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (1960 US prices) 
Prasada Rao (international 1975 prices) 
26 
30 
36 
40 
45 
54 
36 
35 
55 
53 
~ 
1. Direct Estimates 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (U.K. prices) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (Spanish prices) 
Bairoch (calories) 
Van Zanden (wheat equivalents) 
31 
24 
31 
32 
25 
36 
32 
44 
35 
45 
35 
2. Backward Extrapolations 
Moore (European crop units for 1930) 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura (1960 US prices) 
Prasada Rao (international 1975 prices) 
41 
32 
31 
42 
32 
31 
57 
34 
58 
34 
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Notes and Sources OiL, output per worker; O/LM, output per male worker. 
1. Direct Estimates: 
O'Brien and Prados d la Escosura, Appendix A, Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. 
Bairoch 'Niveaux de developpement'. 
Van Zanden, 'The first green revolution' and companion working paper under the 
same title. Van Zanden's total gross outputs include animal feed and seed. In 
order to maintain consistency with other estimates we preferred to use our own 
concepts of labour inputs (i.e. total and male workers employed in 
agriculture). Van Zanden's concept refers to the total number of persons 
dependent upon agriculture. 
O'Brien and Keyder, Economic growth. Their PPP rate for agriculture is very 
narrowly based and the comparison refers to G.B. and not to U.K. - which 
overstates French backwardness compared to U.K. 
O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy'. 
Fremdling, 'productivity comparisons'. Fremdling's PPP rates are based upon 
larger samples of prices than the PPP rates estimated by O'Brien and Keyder 
for France and Britain. His ratios refer to Britain and overstate German 
backwardness compared to U.K. 
2. Backward Extrapolations (with real output indices cited in Appendix A, 
sources for table 6). 
Moore, Economic demography. 
Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development. International wheat equivalents 
are an average based upon the relative agricultural prices compared to wheat 
in USA, Japan and India. 
O'Brien-Prados de la Escosura, 'Agricultural productivity'. We utilized data 
in Hayami-Ruttan, Agricultural development to construct estimates in US prices 
for 1960 and extrapolated the outputs backwards to 1910 with real output 
indices cited in Appendix A.( sources for table 6). 
Van der Meer and van Ark, 'Growth and productivity'. These estimates are 
extrapolated from end year (1975) output data in Van Ooststroom and Maddison 
'An International comparison', which are expressed in 1975 US prices. 
Prasada Rao, 'International comparisons'. International prices or 
international dollars are explained in the text. 
We present direct estimates of the productivity of labour 
and land employed in French, German, Italian and spanish 
agriculture compared to the U.K. for years around 1910 in Panel 
1 of Table 1 below. Two concepts of output (final output and 
gross value added) are represented in the numerator and two 
definitions of labour input (male workers and all agricultural 
workers) have been used to calculate the productivity ratios 
which are measured in current prices and referred for comparisons 
to the united Kingdom, expressed as 100. 
8 
Given the quantity and the quality of data available this 
approach to the calculation of productivity ratios is the 
preferred method on theoretical grounds. It is also amenable to 
expression in simple language. But several scholars engaged in 
similar exercises have adopted other approaches -usually as a 
convenient device for avoiding the time consuming research 
involved in finding and calibrating the data for the current 
prices and quantities of crops and animal products produced by 
national agricultural sectors across Europe for decades when 
statistics are scarce, and subject to higher degrees of error 
than is tolerable today. Their methods, however, also offer 
historians useful ways of estimating productivity ratios for the 
periods in the past when direct information is not available. 
III [~i 
Before analysing the inferences that fl0w from calculations 
in Table 1 it is necessary, therefore, (a) to check our new 'best 
practice' figures against the productivity ratios already 
published or implicit in the work of other scholars; (b) to 
account for discrepancies between them; (c) to explain the 
surprising similarity in the range of estimates thrown up by two 
very different methods used to compile and compare standards of 
productivity achieved by national agricultures during the first 
decade of this century. We propose to concentrate upon variations 
in productivity ratios that are basically generated by the 
procedures used to measure outputs for 1910 and to virtually 
ignore variations produced by different conventions adapted to 
def ine and to measure labour and land inputs. In fact for 
purposes of consistency we applied our preferred concept of 
labour input (total and male labour force employed) to van 
Zanden's output data for 1910. Furthermore it is also germane to 
observe that the results obtained by O'Brien-Toniolo for the 
productivity of labour employed in Italian compared to U.K. 
agriculture are entirely congruent with our results based upon 
a less problematical definition of the labour input as male 
workers employed in agriculture. 
9 
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Two distinct approaches mark the work of other scholars who 
have estimated agrarian outputs in comparable units of account 
for 1910. The first or 'direct method' begins with the available 
figures (or sub-sets of figures) for final outputs crop by crop, 
product by product and converts the data expressed in physical 
units into calories in one example and into wheat equivalents in 
the other. 
The second or indirect method (which is now becoming 
standard practice among economic historians concerned to estimate 
differentials in expenditures or incomes per capita over the long 
run) is to accept the differentials already measured in 
international dollars, U.S. dollars, wheat equivalents or some 
other standard for a contemporary year (1960, 1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985) and to extrapolate the results back in time using indices 
constructed for the measurement of growth in real incomes, 
outputs, populations and workforces over spans of years going 
back to the late nineteenth century and in some examples as far 
as the early eighteenth century.u~ 
First we consider two alternative sets of direct estimates 
for 1910. Bairoch's productivity ratios which are based upon the 
conversion of large samples of agrarian products into calories 
are conceptually flawed because consumers do not buy calories. (19) 
Empirically when compared to our direct estimates Bairoch's 
method leads to biases that emerge as unpredictable in direction 
and variable in magnitude. 
Van Zanden's exercise which converts final outputs to 'wheat 
equivalents' based upon relative international prices for wheat 
circa 1910 compared to other items of agricultural produce is 
clearly preferable on empirical grounds but is still a 
theoretically questionable method of measuring national 
agricultural outputs and relative productivity levels. (20) Even 
in 1910 international markets were far from perfect and farmers 
continued to allocate resources in relation to national and even 
to local price structures. Conceptually, the meaning of national 
10 
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farm outputs expressed in international price relatives is far 
from clear. In a literal sense the numbers provide an indication 
of the aggregated value of a given national agricultural output 
that would in theory have been realized by farmers working within 
the boundaries of a European state, if. they had sold their 
produce at a set of relative prices established on international 
markets. Of course if European farmers en bloc had in practice 
attempted to offload their produce onto world markets that set 
of relative prices would have changed and perhaps radically. 
Although national price structures (particularly for basic arable 
products such as grain) were becoming increasingly embedded 
within international markets, divergences varied by crop, by 
country and by region. Location, transportation, information 
flows, climatic and technical possibilities as well as agrarian 
tariffs all influenced choices faced by farmers. International 
trade and prices certainly impinged on their decisions but to a 
degree that varied significantly from place to place within 
Europe. (21) Thus any exercise which converts a particular 
selection of crops produced, for example, by Andalucian farmers, 
into wheat equivalents based upon international price relatives 
for 1910 is likely to generate numbers of ambiguous meaning when 
used as a base for the analysis of relative agricultural 
efficiency across Europe's economies and regions. (22) While Van 
Zanden's estimates of labour productivity and relative levels of 
income received by agricultural populations across Europe fall 
into line with our results, his output figures seem far too 
optimistic for Germany and are surely too pessimistic for Italy. 
Another familiar way of circumventing the real difficulties 
involved in tracing sufficient quantity and price data to conduct 
multinational comparisons crop by crop, country by country, is 
to construct purchasing power parity rates of exchange. Here the 
objective is still to convert available measures for the values 
of total agricultural outputs (final outputs and gross values 
added) expressed in one currency into another. For familiar 
reasons the accessible quotations of rates of exchange 
established through trade and capital flows across national 
11 
r..~ 
[ -
borders are thought to generate biased results. The alternative 
(and theoretically acceptable) solution is to construct 
"purchasing power parity' (PPP) rates of exchange based upon 
representative samples of agricultural commodities produced in 
any two countries under comparison. For this purpose each 
national sample should contain quantities of farm produce 
weighted in proportion to their significance within the 
aggregated value of national agricultural production. Each basket 
is then priced first in domestic and then in foreign currency and 
rates of exchange (e.g. the sterling value of a 'representative' 
basket of agrarian produce costing 100 francs to buy from farmers 
in France) are then easily calculated. Provided the samples of 
farm produce are properly weighted and representative and that 
foreign prices for equivalent national products are 
ascertainable, PPPs should provide an acceptable substitute for 
the time consuming procedure of converting the value of one 
nation's agricultural outputs into another, commodity by 
commodity, price by price. 
Difficulties arise because the sample of crops and animal 
produce included in such baskets may not adequately represent 
missing components of agricultural production; because foreign 
prices may not exist for important but nationally specific crops 
and because shadow or proxy prices for these unique crops may 
bias the exchange rates in unknown directions. In short the 
method works' best for agricultures producing a comparable mix of 
produce. To exemplify this point we have presented the PPP rates 
implicit in our set of bilateral comparisons of final 
agricultural outputs across European economies for 1910. We 
propose to contrast these comprehensive calculations first with 
trading rates of exchange and then with other published estimates 
based upon representative sampling which offer agricultural and 
overall PPP rates for sterling and francs for sterling and marks. 
Table 2 exposes the margins of error that would follow from 
coverting Spanish, Italian, French and German agricultural 
outputs into sterling at trading rates of exchange. We observe 
L 
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that the degree of overestimation could be considerable for Spain 
and Italy, less significant for France and hardly important for 
Germany. In all trading rates of exchange for 1910 are not badly 
out of line with the true PPP rates that we have established for 
all agricultural products. Indeed trading rates are closer to 
rates for the agricultural sector than economy wide PPP rates 
estimated by O'Brien and Keyder and by Fremdling for francs and 
sterling and for marks and sterling respectively. Their overall 
PPP rates not only fall below trading rates but deviate from our 
comprehensively estimated PPP rates for primary production alone 
by margins that would lead to definite understatements of French 
and German agricultural outputs converted to sterling on these 
coefficients. 
Table 2. Trading and Purchasing Power Parity lPPP) Exchange Rates with 
Sterling for Five European Currencies c. 1910 
Agricultural Trading Overall 
PPP rates Exchange PPP 
Rates Rates 
Weighted by the 
nation's output 
Weighted by 
British output 
Pesetas per E" 27 35 27 
Lire per E" 29 
(35) b 
30 
(32) b 
25· 
France per E" .27 27 25· 
Marks per E" 
(29) • 
22 
(27)" 
21 20" 
29" 
(30)" (30)" 25" 
Sources. (a) Appendix A, Table A.3. 
(b) O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy'. 
(c) O'Brien and Keyder, Economic growth in Britain and France. 
(d) Fremdling, 'Productivity comparisons'. 
(e) Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign 
countries. 
These comparisons also reveal that all estimates for PPP 
rates of exchange are indeed sensitive to sample size and to the 
quality of the data used in their construction. For example the 
lire-sterling rates implicit in the O'Brien-Toniolo comparisons 
of Anglo-Italian agrarian outputs are based upon comprehensive 
[, 
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samples but they also rest on older and less reliable produce, 
price and labour force date than those used here, and produce 
downward biased estimates of Italian output duly converted into 
sterling of 18 per cent on Italian weights and 6 per cent on U.K. 
price weights. The O'Brien-Keyder and the Fremdling PPP rates 
based on tiny and unrepresentative samples of agrarian produce 
generate conversion ratios which lead to the underestimation of 
French and German agricultural outputs compared to U.K. by the 
least 8 per cent on French price weights in the first case and 
around 33 per cent in the case of Germany, regardless of price 
weights. 
For productivity comparisons comprehensive coverage is the 
preferred method and PPP conversion rates based on sampling 
should be sUbjected to sensitivity tests. As Tables 1 and 2 
reveal previous conversions of the outputs (gross values added) 
of the French and German agricultural sectors into sterling 
equivalents at specially constructed PPP rates have produced 
estimates of labour productivity levels that could be discernibly 
understated for France and much more seriously underestimated for 
Germany. Given that in 1910 the agrarian sectors of France and 
Germany employed far larger shares of the workforce than the 
U.K., this finding implies that overall productivity gaps (output 
per man year worked) and implicitly differentials in income per 
head between the three European economies may well be narrower 
than established estimates suggest.a~ Perhaps the size of these 
gaps can only be securely established by converting European 
outputs into sterling sector by sector utilizing a carefully 
constructed set of PPP exchange rates. 
Several authors have offered productivity estimates for 1910 
based upon the alternative indirect and short cut method of 
backward extrapolation from available and presumably accurate 
modern estimates. In this context Moore's report to the League 
of Nations published as long ago as 1945 may be considered 
innovative. Moore computed 'final physical outputs' for a set 
of European countries averaged over the years 1931-35. He then 
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weighted each country's products by a set of 'modal value ratios'[, or 'European wide' relative prices to provide a comparable 
tabulation of final outputs expressed in what he called' European 
crop units'. (24) Moore' s pioneering work anticipates methods 
suggested by Geary in 1958 and developed further by the United 
Nations International comparisons Project (ICP) running from 1970 
to date. Their procedures are designed to convert national 
expenditures and outputs valued in national currencies into an 
invariant and transitive standard called 'international 
dollars' • (25) International dollars (which are widely used by 
economists to estimate variations in levels of per capita income[j 
across countries for benchmark years after 1960 and latterly by 
economic historians to track changes in per capita income 
differentials through time) are difficult to define in simple 
language, and for purposes of cross country comparisons of 
productivity levels this method remains theoretically 
controversial. (26) Basically and in an agrarian context the 
adaptation of the method by Prasada Rao involved pricing grains, 
meat, dairy produce, fruit, vegetables and other farm produce in 
ratio to farm gate dollar prices prevailing in the numeraire 
country, the united states. Such prices in dollars for very long 
lists of farm produce were then transformed into weighted average 
prices. The weights utilized were proportionate to the share of 
a given country in world production for a given output. Prasada 
Rao's standardized estimates for the values of final outputs and 
gross values added expressed in international dollars for 1975 
were extrapolated back to 1910 using established indices 
available to measure growth of real agricultural production 
between these two end years.(2n For 1960 output estimates have 
been published in the form of international wheat equivalents for 
France and Germany by Hayami and Ruttan and Ruttan and Yamada. (28) 
Their methods involved pricing all final outputs expressed in 
physical units in three sets of farm gate relative prices -
relative, that is, to wheat prices prevailing in the united 
States, India and Japan. The resulting aggregates were related 
to the period 1957-62, then averaged geometrically to produce 
comparable indicators of final agricultural outputs for years 
15 
circa 1960 which were then extrapolated backwards to 1880 using 
indices designed to record changes in real output over the[, 
intervening years. Unfortunately, and as Table 1 shows, the 
results for purposes of comparing French and German productivity 
levels with U.K. for 1910 do not correlate at all well with our 
preferred direct methods and can be rejected for Europe. 
On the other hand backward extrapolation of final outputs 
based upon end year conversions using US prices for 1960 generate 
productivity ratios that fall broadly into line with our own 
direct and comprehensive calculations of labour productivities 
for 1910. To be more specific: Table 1 shows that this indirect 
method offers reasonable predictions for French, Italian and 
Spanish productivity levels in 1910; but for reasons that are not 
clear suggests unacceptably high predictions for levels of 
agricultural productivity prevailing in Germany before the First 
World War. (29) 
The use of end year estimates in European crop units for 
1930 or in international dollars for 1975 to make plausible 
suggestions about levels of agrarian productivity for purposes 
of historical analysis cannot be recommended with quite the same 
degree of confidence. Table 1 reveals that such 'predictions' 
for Germany are again particularly suspect. Although predictions 
of productivities for France, Italy and Spain based upon ratios 
of final outputs per worker available or per male worker employed 
by these three national agricultural sectors do fall broadly into 
line with our direct estimates for 1910. 
[j Alas unacceptable discrepancies in both directions appear 
among all the predictions of gross values added per male or per 
person employed in European agriculture. This is unfortunate 
because value added per unit of labour input is a far more 
illuminating index of productivity to contemplate for purposes 
of historical analysis. Furthermore, our own direct estimates 
for 1910 are vulnerable to the ' guesstimates' made in the 
original research related to the proportions of final outputs 
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that represent purchases of industrial inputs and services from 
outside agriculture. Between 1910 and 1975 that proportion 
converged towards the advanced agrarian sector found in the 
United Kingdom. Thus the growth of French, German, Italian and 
Spanish agrarian production measured as deflated gross value 
added will proceed at a slower rate than growth measured in terms 
of increases to the volume of final outputs. Backward 
extrapolations from 1960 and 1975 using standard indices which 
are normally designed to measure changes through time in final 
outputs embody a downward bias. This means that the relative 
productivity estimates for 1910 produced by indirect methods 
overstate the gaps between the advanced agriculture of the united 
kingdom and its more backward neighbours on the mainland. All 
in all our comparisons suggest that available and potentially 
useful indirect methods seem more secure for predictions based 
upon 1960 US prices and upon final outputs than upon 1975 
international dollars or gross values added. 
In theoretical terms backward projection of modern 
productivity ratios could produce increasingly indeterminate 
results as we move through time. First the initial or base line 
ratios (expressed in wheat equivalents, US prices or 
international dollars) are not merely sUbject to errors that flow 
even from modern day differences in the quality of national 
agrarian statistics for quantities, prices, labour and land 
inputs, but'their status as indicators of relative levels of 
national efficiency remain ambiguous. As late as 1975 the 
agrarian price structures to which farmers responded across 
Europe were still some distance from a subset of competitively 
formed international prices. Europe's farmers cannot be 
meaningfully depicted as engaged in the allocation of land and 
labour in relation to American price relatives or by implication 
to that even more abstract set of prices - international dollars. 
Transforming national farm outputs (even for purposes of 
comparison) into numeraires that only imperfectly reflects 
decisions taken by farmers introduces indeterminate degrees of 
bias even into modern estimates designed to facilitate 
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comparisons across Europe. Such biases could moreover be 
compounded by the theoretical and empirical imperfections already 
bl,lilt into the official or acceptable indices of real output 
utilized for backward projections to 1910, particularly for those 
national agricultural sectors undergoing radical transformations 
in crop mix and patterns of relative prices over time. As Table 
3 shows the structure of European agricultures differed rather 
markedly in 1910 not only between Mediterranean regions (Spain 
and Italy) on the one hand and the north-west (U.K. and Germany) 
on the other, but. also in the proportions of final outputs 
obtained from animal compared to arable agriculture. Over the 
twentieth century the animal intensity of European agriculture 
converged at very different speeds towards the United Kingdom 
pattern. 
Table 3. Composition of Agricultural Final Output in Five European Countries 
c. 1910 (Valued in national currencies) (percentages). 
France Germany ll..!.!:l ~ U.K. 
Cereals 22.2 18.6 20.9 31.4 11.0 
Pulses 0.8 0.3 1.3 3.3 0.7 
Vegetables 4.8 8.1 7.2 11.8 6.7 
Raw Materials 3.4 4.7 5.8 3.4 2.9 
Fruits, Nuts 11.7 1.6 9.0 6.9 2.4 
Wines (Must) 12.5 1.1 22.4 6.9 0.0 
Olives 0.2 0.0 4.6 6.0 0.0 
Pasture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
Meat 22.2 34.6 13.1 17.4 42.7 
poultry, Eggs 9.3 3.6 7.4 4.8 6.0 
Milk 12.9 27.1 7.8 8.0 23.2 
Other 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 1.1 
Non-animal 54.9 33.7 68.1 68.3 25.3 
Animal 45.1 66.3 31.9 31.7 74.7 
sources: Appendix A, Table A.4. 
critics of backward projection also point to the familiar 
and formidable index problems involved in this method 
particularly when shares of production covered, and when relative 
prices and the composition of national outputs change through 
time. Their theoretically sound objections could turn out to be 
entirely valid for industry, for services and by extension for 
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GDP and per capita incomes as a whole. Only comparisons between 
estimates obtained by both direct and indirect methods will 
expose the potential margins of error implicit in using short 
cuts and theoretically debateable methods to devise potentially 
useful and quantified perceptions about the past from available 
and more accurate information about the present. (30) 
Nevertheless tests of the kind conducted here for relative 
levels of agricultural income and productivity across Europe 
suggest that backward projections produce some useable results 
for historians for that particular sector. Our confidence in 
ratios so obtained for European agricultures for 1910 is not 
however extendable by implication to industry, services and 
national income because we suspect that changes in product mix 
and relative prices even over the medium run of some five to 
seven decades involved in these exercises in backward 
extrapolation were far more profound outside than within the 
agricultural sector. 
IV 
For our historical analysis we begin with the situation 
before the First World War and for reasons already expounded 
propose to base our initial comments upon direct estimates in 
U.K. prices for 1910. Table 1 shows that the variation between 
labour productivity indicators estimated in either U. K. or 
national prices is narrow except for Spain, where gaps are of the 
order 21 to 25 per cent. For simplicity we can safely refer to 
estimates in U.K. prices and there is no need to present the 
estimates for land productivity (Table 4) in two sets of prices. 
Presumably the wider differential exposed for Spain reflects the 
weaker degree to which Spanish agriculture had become integrated 
into European and international trade over the nineteenth 
century. Alternatively it tells us something about the possible 
scale of medium term and adverse effects that flowed from tariff 
and exchange rate barriers erected by the Spanish government 
L 
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against imported farm produce. (31) Conversely the small gaps 
exposed in Table 1 between valuations in U.K. and domestic prices 
for the other three continental economies suggest that the 
overall size of such macroeconomic effects emanating from similar 
attempts by the French, Italian and German governments to protect 
their farmers from American and Russian grain imports could only 
have represented small percentages of agricultural output and a 
far smaller share of their national incomes. (32) Bairoch has 
pUblished an argument that positive effects on European economies 
flowed from the return to protectionism in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century but his case (based on correlations 
between increased tariffs and growth rates) is not convincing. (33) 
Some degree of misallocation occurred within agriculture and 
between agriculture and other sectors of these four economies. 
For example free trade by depressing the relative level of 
agricultural prices could have forced labour to migrate to towns 
and to the Americas. Furthermore the shares of grain in total 
agricultural outputs measured in U.K. prices are discernibly 
lower than the shares in domestic prices as set out in Table 3. (34) 
Apart from Spain the narrow spread exposed in Table 1 between 
agricultural outputs measured in domestic or U.K. prices weakens 
arguments by liberals at the time and by economic historians 
writing today that significant losses flowed from the erection 
of tariff barriers against American and Russian grain in the late 
nineteenth century. (35) 
Nothing surprising emerges from the rank order of labour 
incomes and labour productivity across European agricultures. 
By 1910 France and Germany had managed to reallocate a greater 
share of their workforces and populations into jobs outside 
agriculture than Italy and spain. Over the long nineteenth 
century the two Mediterranean economies experienced more rapid 
rates of external migration than Germany or France but their 
towns and industries had not developed rapidly enough to pUll a 
large enough share of underemployed labour from the countryside. 
Over the longer run the retention of substantial but largely 
redundant populations and workforces in spain and Italy (and by 
[ 
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extension in other rural economies) depressed output per worker 
employed in farming and restrained the growth of rural per capita 
incomes for a majority of those European populations who 
continued to be attached to the land. As late as 1910 
industrialization, urbanization within and migration beyond the 
borders of Italy and Spain had only managed to raise rural 
incomes (OIL) to something close to a third of comparable U.K. 
levels. While the agricultural populations of France and Germany 
enjoyed standards of living that probably approached 60% of those 
levels. 
Productivity gaps measured in terms of an inclusive 
difinition of the agricultural workforce (OIL) and based upon the 
occupational categories adopted by demographic censuses (which 
were after all designed to enumerate and classify national 
populations basically for military purposes) are misleading as 
indicators of relative efficiency. As we suggest above such 
indices are best utilized as proxies for relative standards of 
living among Europe's rural populations. When agricultural 
outputs are divided by the more accessible and comparable index 
of labour inputs - namely by male workers employed (O/LM) - the 
productivity gap (and impressions of relative backwardness) 
narrows significantly for France and Italy, all but disappears 
for Germany but remains intact and wide for spain. Given the 
insoluble problems involved in defining and measuring the total 
amount of labour time actually utilized by national agricultural 
sectors to produce outputs across Europe, we sugqest that 
discussions of productivity differentials could be more securely 
based upon ratios that utilize numbers of male workers employed 
as their denominator. (36) 
A table of agrarian productivity ratios for decades towards 
the early stages of European industrialization would be entirely 
illuminating to analyze. Unfortunately our data begins in 1890 
when the agricultures of Germany and France had caught up with 
the first industrial nation but when the Mediteranean economies 
of Italy and above all of Spain still had a long way to go. 
[ 
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Agrarian historians now appreciate why the physical yields per 
hectare of grains, pulses and several other arable crops as well 
as the outputs of animal products per unit of foodstuffs have 
varied systematically across Europe's geographical regions. (37) At 
given ranges of agronomic knowledge and techniques available to[ . 
L 
raise arable and animal produce, for centuries those unlucky 
European farmers compelled to cultivate the soils and ~o cope 
with the climates and elevations of Italy, Iberia and Southern 
France found themselves at a disadvantage compared to better 
endowed farmers working the land of western Europe. (38) Until a 
wider set of agrarian technologies came on stream rather late in 
the nineteenth century, Mediterranean yields per hectare for 
grains and animal products could not be expected to approach the 
average standards achieved by the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Northern France and large parts of the German plain. 
For Italy and Spain, and similarly endowed countries! the hard 
facts of place and climate set limits for potential levels of 
output and productivities per worker, employed in agriculture.(39) 
[ , 
Furthermore, and (with the exception of Spain) our estimates 
of relative levels of land productivity (again measured in pounds 
sterling) do not lend support to the familiar criticism that over 
the nineteenth century continental agricultures suffered from 
serious allocative inefficiencies, institutional failures or 
political obstacles which reduced total agricultural production 
sUbstantially below optimal levels.~~ On the contrary the 
evidence for the productivity of land in 1910 indicates that the 
peasantries of Germany, France and Italy obtained higher average 
levels of returns per hectare than the farmers of Britain and 
Ireland (Table 4). 
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Table 4. The Productivity of Land Used in European Agricultures c. 1919 
(U.K. = 199) 
Final Outputs Gross Value Added Land-Labour Ratios (in U.K. Prices (U.K. Prices for (Compared to U.K.\ 
of 1919\ 1919\ Per Per Male 
Worker Worker 
France 143 188 41 69 
Germany 168 239 33 58 
Italy 165 231 19 28 
Spain 54 77 58 59 
Denmark 53 73 
Netherlands 38 39 
Sources: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K., Appendix A, Table A.1; 
Denmark and the Netherlands, Table 5. 
Alas 1910 (selected simply because reasonable data happens 
to be available) represents both a base and a final year for the 
analysis pursued here. Nevertheless, some agrarian historians 
tend to argue (without the sort of numbers tabulated above to 
support their suggestions) that differentials in revenues per 
hectare favoured the progressive English agriculture, already in 
the eighteenth century. Comparable productivity data for 
benchmark years earlier than 1910 are certainly required to 
measure these margins. Meanwhile there is no need to assume that 
European land (as well as European labour) productivities fell 
below U.K. levels for long stretches of time before the early 
twentieth century. 
Our data and this comment does not imply that only very 
limited increments to total output might have been secured either 
by the reallocation of land to more valuable or higher yielding 
crops, or through reforms to tenurial institutions, or 
alternatively by changes to governmental policies, and 
particularly to the tariffs created to protect most European (but 
not British) farmers from American competition from 1873 onwards. 
Rather what this data set does is to qualify arguments which 
begin from the premise that the relative backwardness of European 
agricultures can be explained in any large degree by contrast 
between efficient and less efficient agrarian organizations, 
favourable and unfavourable governmental policies and from 
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presumed failures to diffuse 'English practices' onto the 
r mainland. Final outputs per unit of land utilized to cultivatel_ 
crops and rear animals may in general and over long periods of 
time have been higher in several European regions~l) Furthermore 
the differences with U.K. agriculture as measured albeit on this 
one indicator is even more pronounced for gross value added. 
Table 5. Land:Labour Ratios in European and American Agricultures (Total 
Arable Hectares Cultivated Plus Land Used for Pasture per Male Worker 
Employed) 
France Germany Italy Spain UK* USA Denmark Netherlands 
1890 6.0 6.4 3.3 6.9 10.7 39.2 6.3 5.0 
1910 6.9 6.6 3.2 6.7 11.4 44.1 8.3 4.4 
1930 7.9 6.5 3.3 8.9 13.6 48.7 8.2 4.4 
1950 10.2 6.8 3.3 6.6 16.0 70.7 9.2 4.3 
1960 13.0 9.1 4.3 8.3 20.8 117.0 10.1 6.0 
1970 17.6 14.3 6.9 13.0 28.5 168.7 17.2 6.5 
1975 21.0 14.2 8.1 16.4 31.9 202.4 22.1 6.8 
1980 24.9 18.8 9.6 20.9 35.0 246.6 23.5 7.7 
Sources: Appendix A. 
*Note: Pre 1926 UK, that is, today's U.K. plus Eire.  
European farmers (including the Dutch and the Danes) 
continued to operate with significantly lower ratios of land to 
labour than British farmers. They had (as economic theory 
predicts and as our data now verifies) used their abundant 
resource, labour, to intensify the cultivation of land and to 
maximise monetary returns per hectare cuItivated or used for 
animal husbandry. with so much underemployed and family labour 
time at their disposal they had not proceeded nearly as far as 
British farmers in purchasing agricultural inputs (machinery, 
tools, fertilizers, chemicals and power) and urban services 
(transportation, distribution, and financial assistance) from 
specialized industrial and service sectors. Their rational 
economic interest in performing services for themselves and in 
finding substitutes on the farm for the urban services and 
industrial inputs purchased by British farmers can, moreover, be 
measured in terms of the relative ratios of gross values added 
to final outputs. compared to the U. K. where a ratio of 
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approximately 67 per cent indicates just how much further 
specialization across the sectors had proceeded by 1910, the 
ratio for France comes to 88, for Germany 92, Italy 93 and Spain 
95 per cent. (42) 
To sum up: our perceptions (based upon comparisons at this 
macro level across five major European countries are as follows: 
at given levels of technology, by 1910 (and possibly decades 
before that) the potential for raising output per worker, per 
hectare and the incomes of continental populations dependant on 
agriculture seem rather limited. Mainland European economies 
could only develop and converge towards U.K. standards of 
agrarian productivity (and by implications to its overall level 
of income per capita) by radical shifts in the allocation of 
labour away from primary production. That shift occurred at a 
rapid but far from steady rate over this century when all 
European economies ran down shares of their workforces producing 
agricultural outputs to mere fractions of the proportions still 
on the land in 1910.~~ 
Further historical perspective on the significance of the 
agricultural base for Europe's long transition to urban 
industrial economies can also be. derived by tracking that process 
from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth century. Our 
preferred method would be to chart structural change 
statistically by constructing benchmark estimates for land and 
labour productivities, in U.K. and in 'other' countries prices, 
decade by decade. Unfortunately the research required to make 
these numbers is beyond our capacities. Instead we fall back 
upon the indirect and short cut method of backward extrapolation 
from end year estimates of outputs expressed in united States 
prices for 1960. Our caveats and reservations about this device 
have been enunciated but we have also observed that backward 
extrapolation based on united States prices for 1960 predict 
relative productivities, for 1910, rather accurately. 
Furthermore, we have also compared the ratios in Table 6 
(expressed in 1960 US prices) with ratios for France, Germany, 
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Italy and Spain expressed for 1930 in European crop prices and 
for 1970, 1975 and 1980 in international dollars. Our 
theoretical qualms are assuaged by the high degree of correlation 
between two sets of estimates, one based upon direct methods and 
the other on backward extrapolation. To maintain consistency 
with earlier tables we have retained pre 1926 U.K. (i.e. the 
territory of Britain plus Northern Ireland plus Eire) as the base 
for comparison but have included estimates for the united States, 
Denmark and the Netherlands for a discussion of trends and 
convergences. 
Technological possibilities for raising agrarian outputs per 
hectare cultivated and per worker employed took a quantum leap 
forward with the diffusion of chemicals, internal combustion 
engines; new machinery, electricity, factory farming techniques, 
scientific management and other inputs into European agricultures 
from the late nineteenth century onwards.~) Our estimates show 
that the US, as the pioneer in developing 'modern' agriculture, 
widened its lead over Europe during the twentieth century. Only 
Danish agriculture has shown signs (and then only from time to 
time) of a capacity to rival the levels of labour productivity 
and rural incomes achieved in the US. Whatever may be happening 
to the relative eff iciency of their industry and service sectors, 
European agricultures display no indications of any long term 
tendency to converge towards American standards of labour 
productivity and rural incomes per capita.(4S) This arises 
because land-labour ratios in the United States have remained 
consistently and massively higher than comparable European 
ratios. That historical advantage (together with the high 
ratios of capital to labour enjoyed by American farmers) seems 
to have widened over the last hundred years despite the exodus 
of rural labour from the European countryside. Unlike industry 
European agricultures continue to operate within a traditional 
system of resource and demographic parameters that render the 
notion of catch-up with the United States improbable and 
irrelevant. European farmers, as Table 6 graphically reveals, 
have continued to maximise returns per hectare cuItivated. Their 
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superiority over the Americans on this particular indicator is 
long standing, very clear, and in the Dutch case vivid. 
Thus the progress and relative efficiencies of national 
agricultures are best compared within a resource heritage of 
similar or potentially comparable land-labour ratios. When we 
use data for the U.K. as our standard of what other continental 
economies could hope historically to achieve in terms of output 
per worker and returns per hectare, the degrees of divergence and 
convergence over the last century emerged as illuminating to 
reflect upon -both within an agrarian context and also in the 
wider context of relative changes in levels of per capita income 
within Europe over the last two centuries. 
For northwestern Europe (France, Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands) convergence towards U.K. levels of labour 
productivity (O/LM) could be anticipated in 1890 if not long 
before -when gaps had already narrowed. The disappearance of 
differentials in rural incomes (OIL) across this sUb-group of 
countries would, however, take longer to achieve because their 
farms and tenurial systems sustained far larger numbers of 
redundant and underemployed family labourers than had 
traditionally been the case within British agriculture. As the 
relative size of agrarian work forces in these four continental 
countries decreased over time, the productivity and incomes of 
those who remained in the countryside converged towards (and in 
the cases of Denmark and Holland surpassed) historical standards 
set by the lead country. 
As the data shows progress in the reallocation of farm labour 
to industry and services was clearly restrained and interrupted 
by the effects of two world wars and the great depression, but 
the long term trends towards convergence are clear and familiar 
from kuznetsian literature on structural change. 
Unfortunately for their rural populations the advance of 
Europe's Mediterranean regions towards parity with U.K. levels 
r- of productivity has still not occurred. Although they experienced 
1-- unusually rapid rates of growth in the productivity of labour 
employed from 1950 to 1980, Italian and Spanish agriculture have 
not caught up. (46) Despite high levels of emigration and 
migration to the towns and the diffusion of new additions to the 
[ 
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stock of knowledge available for ral.sl.ng the pruductivity of 
Mediterranean farming, the average productivity of males employed 
(O/LM) and average incomes received by workers dependant upon 
Italian and spanish agricultures (OIL) stand in comparative terms 
roughly where they were a century ago. Returns per hectare 
cultivated (O/H) certainly improved in relative terms but at 
nothing like the rates that approximated to the outstanding 
performance of farmers in the Netherlands. Until new agrarian 
technologies emerge to compensate for their initial or base line 
disadvantages of relatively high ratios of labour to land (by 
land here we mean hectares of comparable fecundity) , 
Mediterranean agricultures seem severely and persistently 
constrained in their attempts to move towards the standards of 
labour productivity long established by the farmers of the U.K. 
and latterly by farmers throughout western Europe. To 'catch-up' 
they must maximize returns per acre and shed labour. While the 
potential to raise final output and gross value per hectare 
cultivated appears prima facie greater in spain than Italy, there 
are limits (to the maximization of returns per hectare) set by 
price and income elasticities of demand for Mediterranean produce 
and by basic resource endowments. In terms of returns per hectare 
the record of Italian farmers was already impressive in 1910 but 
has hardly improved in relation to the United Kingdom since 1930. 
There can, moreover, be no easy assumption that the astonishing 
but special achievements of the Netherlands in ral.sl.ng 
productivity per hectare cultivated are more than tangentially 
relevant to Italy and spain.~~ No doubt the farms of 
Mediterranean Europe and to a more limited extent farms located 
in some parts of north western Europe continue to sustain labour 
that could be released to industrial and service sectors without 
reducing the potential growth of agricultural output. That 
option first assumes the urban economy will develop and continue 
to atract more labour into better paid and secure jobs outside 
agriculture. secondly the last stages of structural change in 
Europe depends upon the further reorganization of tenures and 
farming methods in order to achieve economies of scale within 
agriculture. Even in the late twentieth century and at this 
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advanced stage of European industrialization, there is no 
expectation that conditions for the further transformation of 
Italian and spanish agriculture will be established easily or 
quickly enough to bring about a convergence towards the advanced 
standards of labour procutivity achieved by the United Kingdom 
let alone by Holland, the present day frontrunner. While the 
size of the productivity gap that has now opened up between 
European and American agricultures really undermines any 
prospects for catch-up over the foreseeable future with the 
united states. What European farmers face is an almost 
insuperable natural disadvantage in relation to that land 
abundant continent. 
v 
comparative economic history requires a reasonably secure 
data base rooted in productivity estimates in order to advance 
understanding of the pace and pattern of European development 
over the long run. Our estimates and critical survey of other 
research in this field shows that the construction of that base 
is fraught not only with the usual empirical difficulties 
involved in using imperfect data but with serious conceptual 
problems involved in defining outputs and inputs for purposes of 
international comparison. Numbers continue to appear but some 
are ambiguous in meaning and others provide misleading indices 
of the gaps in productivity across countries. Nevertheless (and 
in the absence of historical data required for direct estimation) 
backward extrapolation, at least as far as 1910, can provide 
reasonable predictions for the levels of land and labour 
productivities that prevailed eighty or a hundred years ago. 
Furthermore, inferences drawn from the estimates of 
comparative levels of productivity for 1910 and from the trends 
towards convergence over the twentieth century, provide the 
statistical basis for some general observations on connections 
between agriculture and industry in European economic history. 
Economic historians know that the industrialization of the lead 
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or reference country (U.K.) was facilitated by high and 
increasing levels of labour productivity in agriculture which 
allowed that economy to release high shares of the workforce to 
towns, industry and services as well as to its imperial markets 
overseas at an unusually early date.(48) The Kingdom's comparative 
advantages emanated from historically favourable land-labour 
ratios and from natural endowments that were in general 
hospitable to the limited range of agrarian technologies 
available to raise returns per hectare between the late Middle 
Ages and the late nineteenth century. 
By comparison the long term growth of most other continental 
economies seems constrained by a historical legacy of higher 
population densities coupled with unfavourable land-labour 
ratios. In Mediterranean Europe this legacy was not only 
relatively more malign but the environmental constraints upon the 
spread of new fodder crops, rotations legumes and the mixed 
husbandry of the first agrarian revolution held their potential 
for development way below the achievements of north western 
Europe right down to the presente day.~~ Indeed the record for 
1890-80 suggests that the comparative disadvantages of 
Mediterranean Europe in agriculture have perhaps been as 
pronounced as the comparative disadvantage of Europe as a whole 
vis-a-vis American agriculture. The prospects of spain, Italy 
and similar regions for convergence resides (and presumably have 
resided for perhaps two or three centuries) in reducing the 
shares of employment in agriculture to a tiny proportion of the 
present workforce and in concentrating on the production of an 
entirely narrow range of crops suited to Mediterranean conditions 
and for which income elasticities of demand are high. Looking 
back over la longue duree persuades us that the final run down 
of Europe's relatively backward agricultures will be difficult 
to achieve even in the late twentieth century; and that such 
agricultures were never placed to lend the kind and scale of 
support for industry that favoured the first industrial nation 
and its immediate followers on the continent in the eighteenth 
and ninetenth centuries. 
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Table 5 
Sources: 
Agricultural land: Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural 
development, p. 458, all countries, 1960, 1970 and 1980; 
Prasada Rao, International comparisons, p. 66, all 
countries, 1975; for 1890-1950, USA, Hayami and Ruttan, 
Agricultural development, pp. 480-481; Denmark and Germany, 
Yamada and Ruttan, 'International comparisons', Tables A-2, 
A-3; France, Toutain, Le produit, ii, pp. 214-215; 
Netherlands, Mitchell, European historical statistics, p.; 
Italy, O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy', p. 401; 
Somrnario di statistiche storiche italiane; United Kingdom, 
O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy', p. 401; 
Mitchell, British historical statistics, pp. 186-194; 
Yamada and Ruttan, 'International comparisons', Table A-5; 
Spain, Simpson, 'New estimates'; Estadlsticas basicas, p. 
143. 
Male labour: Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development, 
p. 457, all countries, 1960, 1970 and 1980; for 1890-1950: 
USA, Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development, p. 480; 
Denmark and Germany, Yamada and Ruttan, , International 
comparisons' , Tables A-2, A-3; Mitchell, European 
historical statistics, p. 164; France, U.K. ,Netherlands, 
Italy, Mitchell, European historical statistics, pp. 
163-171; Vitali, La popolazione attiva, p. 88; Spain, 
Nicolau, 'La poblaci6n', p. 78. 
Table 6 
Sources: 
Levels of output for 1960 in us prices: Hayami and Ruttan, 
Agricultural development, pp. 454-455, estimated each 
country's agricultural output by using US wheat relative 
prices. When their figures expressed in US wheat equivalent 
units (1,000 kg) are multiplied by the US price of one 
metric ton we derive each country's output in 1960 dollars 
valued at US prices. 
Indice. of real output: Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural 
development, p. 457, all countries, 1960, 1970 and 1980; 
for 1890-1975, USA, Denmark, U.K.; 1960-1975, France, 
Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development, pp. 467-471; 
Ojala, Agriculture and economic progress, pp. 191-217; 
Feinstein, National income, T24; Toutain, Le produit, ii, 
p. 128-129; Germany, Hoffmann et al., pp. 320-323; Yamada 
and Ruttan, 'International comparisons', Table A-2; 
Netherlands, van der Meer and van Ark, 'Growth and 
productivity', pp. 76-78; Italy, Ercolani, 'Documentazione 
statistica di base', pp. 410-412, 415; Spain, Simpson, 'New 
estimates'; Hemberg, 'Informe preliminar', p. 122; Cuentas 
del sector agrario 
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Agricultural land: Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural 
development, p. 458, all countries, 1960, 1970 and 1980; 
Prasada Rao, International comparisons, p. 66, all 
countries,  1975; for 1890-1950, USA, Hayami and Ruttan, 
Agricultural development, pp. 480-481; Denmark and Germany, 
Yamada and Ruttan, 'International comparisons', Tables A-2, 
A-3; France, Toutain, Le produit, ii, pp. 214-215; 
Netherlands, Mitchell, European historical statistics, p.; 
Italy, O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy', p. 401; 
sOmmario di  statistiche storiche italiane; United Kingdom, 
O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy', p. 401; 
Mitchell, British historical statistics, pp. 186-194; 
Yamada and Ruttan, 'International comparisons', Table A-5; 
Spain, Simpson, 'New estimates'; Estadlsticas basicas, p. 
143. 
Male labour: Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development, 
p. 457, all countries, 1960, 1970 and 1980; for 1890-1950: 
USA, Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural development, p. 480; 
Denmark and Germany, Yamada and Ruttan, 'International 
comparisons', Tables A-2, A-3; Mitchell, European 
historical statistics, p. 164; France, U.K. ,Netherlands, 
Italy, Mitchell, European historical statistics, pp.[: 163-171; Vitali, La popolazione attiva, p. 88; spain, 
Nicolau, 'La poblaci6n', p. 78. 
Total labour: Prasada Rao, International comparisons, p. 
39, all countries, 1970, 1975 and 1980; for 1890-1960, USA, 
Davis, Easterlin and Parker (eds.), American economic 
growth, p. 187; Denmark, Germany, France, U.K., Mitchell, 
European historical statistics, pp. 162-171; Toutain, Le 
produit, ii, p. 201; Netherlands, van der Meer and van Ark, 
'Growth and productivity', pp. 76-78; Italy, Zamagmi, 'A 
century of change', p. 36; Spain, Nicolau, 'La poblaci6n', 
p. 78. 
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Table A.1 
Agricultural productivity in Five European Countries c.1910 
(Pounds sterling at U.K. prices) 
spain Italy France Germany 
[ 
Agricultural Final output (0) 
(106 E) 139.8 282.4 432.4 483.4 
Gross Value Added at market prices (VA) 
(106 E) 132.5 263.9 380.5 442.2 
[ Agricultural Land (T) 
(000 Ha) 31,308 20,799 36,799 34,878 
Arable Land (Ta) 
(000 Ha) 19,149 14,719 21,561 26,200 
Labour Force in Agriculture (L) 
(000) 5,137 10,538 8,560 9,883 
Male Labour Force in Agriculture (Lm) 
(000) 4,680 6,465 5,331 5,284 
Agricultural Final output per Worker (OjL) 
(E) 27.2 26.8 50.5 48.9 
Agricultural Final Output per Male Worker (OjLm) 
(E) 29.9 43.7 81.1 91.5 
Final Output per Hectare of Agricultural Land (OjT) 
(E) 4.5 13.6 11.8 13.9 
L: Value Added per Worker (VAjL) 
(E) 25.8 25.0 44.5 44.7 
Value Added per Male Worker (VAjLm) 
(E) 28.3 40.8 71.4 83.7 
Value Added per Hectare of Agricultural Land (VAjT) 
( E) 4.2 12.7 10.3 12.7 
Agricultural Land per Worker (TjL) 
(Ha) 6.1 2.0 4.3 3.5 
Agricultural Land per Male Worker (TjLm)[ (Ha) 6.7 3.2 6.9 6.6 
U.K. 
207.2 
138.7 
25,202 
7,883 
2,381 
2,205 
87.0 
94.0 
8.2 
58.3 
62.9 
5.5 
10.6 
11. 4 
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Table A.2 
Agricultural Productivity in Five European Countries c.1910 
(at national prices) 
Spain Italy France Germany U.K. 
(Pta) (Lire) (Francs) (Marks) (E) 
Agricultural Final Output (0) 
(106) 3 , 842 8 , 084 11 , 666 10,565 207.2 
Gross Value Added at market prices (VA) 
(106) 3,650 7,554 10,266 9,665 138.7 
Agricultural Land (T) 
(000 Ha) 31,308 20,799 36,799 34,878 25,202 
Arable Land (Ta) 
( 000 Ha) 19 , 149 14,719 21,561 26,200 7,883 
Labour Force in Agriculture (L) 
(000) 5,137 10,538 8,560 9,883 2,381 
Male Labour Force in Agriculture (Lm) 
(000) 4,680 6,465 5,331 5,284 2,205 
Agricultural Final output per Worker (OjL) 
748 767 1,363 1,069 87.0 
Agricultural Final output per Male Worker (OjLm) 
821 1,250 2,188 1,999 94.0 
Final output per Hectare of Agricultural Land (OjT) 
123 389 317 303 8.2 
Value Added per Worker (VAjL) 
711 717 1,199 978 58.3 
Value Added per Male Worker (VAjLm) 
780 1,168 1,926 1,829 62.9 
Value Added per Hectare of Agricultural Land (VAjT) 
117 363 279 277 5.5 
Agricultural Land per Worker (TjL) 
(Ha) 6.1 2.0 4.3 3.5 10.6 
Agricultural Land per Male Worker (TjLm) 
(Ha) 6.7 3.2 6.9 6.6 11.4 
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[ Table A.3 
Trading and Purchasing power Parity Exchange Rates with 
sterling for Five European Currencies c. 1910 
Agricultural purchasing Trading 
power parity rates exchange rates 
(1) (2) (3) 
weighted by weighted by 
national output British output 
Pesetas per E 27.4908 35.1976 27.24 
Lire per E 28.6216 29.8612 25.00 
Francs per E 26.9776 27.3074 25.25 
Marks per E 21.8556 21.3617 20.00 
f, 
Table A.4 
Composition of Agricultural Final Output in Five European 
Countries c. 1910 (valued in national and U.K. prices) ) 
France Germany Italy spain U.K. 
Francs E Marks E Lire E Pta E E 
Cereals 22.2 17.9 18.6 13.1 20.9 15.2 31.4 22.6 11. 0 
Pulses 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.1 3.3 2.0 0.7 
Vegetables 4.8 3.7 8.1 10.2 7.2 14.9 11.8 16.0 6.7 
Raw Material 3.4 3.6 4.7 4.8 5.8 3.7 3.4 2.8 2.9 
Fruits Nuts 11. 7 11. 7 1.6 4.0 9.0 17.6 6.9 16.7 2.4 
Wines (Must) 12.5 13.9 1.1 0.5 22.4 14.3 6.9 9.8 0.0 
Olives 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.6 3.2 6.0 5.3 0.0 
Pasture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
Meat 22.2 21.3 34.6 33.2 13.1 12.4 17.4 15.4 42.7 
Poultry Eggs 9.3 14.4 3.6 5.0 7.4 9.1 4.8 5.1 6.0 
Milk 12.9 13.0 27.1 29.0 7.8 8.1 8.0 4.3 23.2 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.1 
[ Non-animal 54.9 50.5 33.7 32.3 68.1 67.7 68.3 73.7 25.3 Animal 45.1 49.5 66.3 67.7 31.9 32.3 31.7 26.3 74.7 
[ 
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APPENDIX A 
Sources: 
Tables A.l and A.2 
Final output and gross value added: spain, Appendix B and value 
added to final output ratio derived from Vandel16s, 'La richesse 
et le revenue de la peninsule iberique'; Italy, Federico, 'Il 
valore aggiunto dell'agricoltura'; France, Toutain, Le produit 
de l'agriculture francaise, pp. 128-129, 131; United Kingdom, 
Ojala, Agriculture and economic progress, pp. 191-217; Germany, 
Hoffmann 
320-323. 
et al., Das wachstum der deutschen wirtschaft, pp. 
Note: ex
figures 
cept 
in 
for Spain, there 
Tables A.1 and A.2 
are 
and 
discrepancies 
in Appendix 
between 
B since 
the 
the 
latter's coverage of final output despite being very large is not 
complete. 
Agricultural land and arable land: We follow Hayami and Ruttan's 
(and F.A.O.'s) definition of land inputs and derive figures for 
arable land (including temporary fallow and grass) and 
agricultural land (to cover also permanent pasture and meadows) . 
Whereas there are not major problems in identifying the extension 
of arable land, the assessment of total agricultural land 
presents obstacles difficult to overcome, i.e., rough and 
mountain grazing is not always included (e.g., O'Brien and 
Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy'). 
For Spain, we followed Simpson's proposal of de-aggregating 
meadows and pasture from the category "meadows, pasture and 
forestry" offered by Spanish official statistics and we adopted 
conversion coefficients from F.A.O.; arable land from Simpson, 
'New estimates for agricultural production'; Italy and the united 
Kingdom, O'Brien and Toniolo, 'The poverty of Italy', p. 401, but 
including rough and mountain grazing into agricultural land; 
France, Toutain, Le produit, ii, 214-215; Hoffmann et al., Das 
wachstum, pp. 268-269. 
Labour and male labour: spain, Nicolau, 'La poblaci6n', p.78; 
Italy, male labour, Vitali, La popolazione attiva, p. 88; total 
labour, Zamagni, 'A century of change', p. 36; France, total 
labour, Toutain, Le produit, ii, 201; male labour, Mitchell, 
European historical statistics, p. 163; U.K. and Germany, 
Mitchell, European historical statistics, p. 163-166, 171. 
Table A. 3: Purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates are 
derived from Appendix B. PPP exchange rates are obtained through 
weighting pairs of national price sets (U.K. 's and another 
nation's) twice: by each continental European nation's output and 
by U.K. 's output. Appendix B provides information to obtain 
directly PPPS weighted by British output and data to derive PPPS 
weighted by each continental European country's output. Trading 
44 
exchange rates, O'Brien and Keyder, Economic growth, p. 47; 
Fremdling, 'Productivity comparisons', p. 33; Italy's Lira and[ the French Franc were exchanged at 1:1 ratio in the eve of World 
War I; Spain, Martinez Mendez, 'Nuevos datos', p. 564. 
Ta~l. A.4: Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX B 
Agrioultural Final output in Western Europe: Spain. Italy. 
Franoe. Germany and the United Kingdom 0. 1910. 
Final agricultural output is defined as total production less 
seed, animal feed and wastage. Final output for most crops and 
animal produce in the five countries were mUltiplied by two sets 
of farm gate (or by shadow prices wherever farm gate prices were 
not available) to derive aggregate final outputs for each 
nation's agriculture. U.K. prices and each nation's prices were 
used alternatively. This Appendix presents physical quantities 
for final output expressed in metric quintals (MQ) , national sets 
of farm gate prices (and shadow prices) per metric quintal of 
each product, and values in sterling and in each nation's own 
currency for every country's agricultural products. 
The sources used were: for Spain, James Simpson's unpublished 
work sheets for his paper 'New estimates for agricultural 
production', with minor adjustments for seed and animal feed; 
Italy, Giovanni Federico's unpublished manuscript 'Il valore[' aggiunto dell'agricoltura'; for France, Jean Claude Toutain's Le 
produit de l'agriculture franCaise, vol. II; for the united 
Kingdom, E.M. Ojala's Agriculture and economic progress; for 
Germany, Walther Hoffmann and associates, Das wachstum der 
deutschen wirtschaft. 
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AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A B C 0 E I F G 
FINAL OUTPUT 
8 PROOUCTS 
9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY[ 000 MO 000 MO 000 MO 000 MO 000 MO 
11 
12 CEREALS 
13 Wheat 30532 45237 74820 12560 32813 
14 Barley 5594 779 5916 13421 0 
15 Rye 5433 1057 9730 183 66045 
16 Oats 845 0 12121 7590 6077 
17 Maize 3844 12821 3399 0 0 
18 Rice 2164 4956 0 0 0 
19 Mill et 13 
Sorghl.lll 6 
21 Tranquillon 168 945 1761 
22 Escanda 100 3469 
23 Others 0 136 2749 
24 
25 LEGUMES 
26 Chickpeas 795 313 
27 Broad beans 744 2313 
28 Beans 1280 945 2500 1189 86 
29 Peas 66 138 813 1049 
Lent i ls 84 70 
31 Carob beans 128 28 
32 Lupin 56 339 
33 Alvejones 21[ 34 Yeros 34 73 
35 Others 0 
36 
37 
38 VEGETABLES 
39 Potatoes 20660 14213 75350 46882 174733 
Onions 1119 
41 Garl ic 
42 Tomatoes 3018 6781 
43 Melons 2487 1762 
44 Cabbages 9794 
45 Lettuce 1548 
46 Peppers 1365 
47 Cucumber 315 
48 SlOeet DOtatoes 589 
49 Asparagus 83 
Green Beans 1504[-, 51 Green Broad Beans 
52 Green Peas 
53 Carrots 124 
54 Artichokes 728 
55 Caul i flolOer 
56 Radish 19 
57 Spinach 
58 Eggplant 
59 Celery etc. 916 
Forrage Beet 0 
61 Turnips 0 
62 Vegt. NES 4772 12581 37610 
63 Others 
64 
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AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A B C 0 E F G 
FINAL OOTPUT 
8 PRODUCTS 
9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
10 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 
65 
66 RAW MATERIALS 
67 Sugar Beet 8662 15180 74690 31 150077 
68 Groundnuts 126 125 521 957 
69 Hops 37 180 191 
70 Sugar Cane 2828 
71 Esparto Grass 1097 
n Saffron 1 
73 Tobacco 3 69 210 250 
74 Cotton 
75 Flax 9 28 327 106 126 
76 Hemp 75 674 
n Wool 276 204 344 473 232 
78 Silk Cocoons 8 563 66 
79 Liquorice 150[ 80 Others 
81 
82 FRUITS & NUTS 4726 17830 
83 Oranges 8320 3347 
84 Lemons 392 3724 
85 Carobs 0 550 
86 Pomegranates 297 
87 Almonds 953 2356 
88 Figs 1443 2477 
89 Hazelnuts 0 213 
90 Chestnuts 1536 6900 
91 Walnuts 137 520 
92 Strawberries 68 
93 PII.JIlS 271 609 
94 Cherries 168 686 
95 Apricots 152 213 
96 Pears 640 1984 
97 Apples 1533 2832 
98 Peaches 192 2260 
99 Quinces 79 69 
100 Grapes 1972 2300 
101 Raisins 189 
102 Other Citrics 350 
103 India Figs 1100 
104 Pistachio 16 
105 Bananas 
106 Others 
107 
108 WINES 
109 Must (OOOHl) 15062 42855 52790 2419 
110 Subproducts 
111 Cider (OOOH I) 15900 
112 
113 OLIVES 
114 Ol ive Oi I (OOOH I) 2197 2739 
115 Ol ives 535 200 713 
116 Subproducts 
117 
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A B C D E F G 
7 FINAL OUTPUT 
8 PROOUCTS 
9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
10 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 000 MQ 
118 
119 PASTURE &FORESTRY 36238 
120 
121 MEAT &DAIRY PRODUCE 
122 MEAT 
123 Beef &Veal 1162 2577 8910 7706 10575 
124 Mutton &Lamb 612 703 1200 3104 636 
125 Goatmeat 132 197 
126 Pigmeat 1877 2559 5240 4064 18594 
127 Rabbitmeat 155 
128 Horsemeat 78 
129 
130 POULTRY &EGGS 
131 Poultrymeat 909 335 894 
132 Eggs 2461 2393 1379 2350 
133 
134 MILK 88000 79964 
135 Cow 6938 30836 215231 
136 Sheep 310 2812 
137 Goat 1915 2082 9573 
138 
139 HONEY 166 
140 
141 HORSES(OOO) 33 76 
142 
143 Other Produce 
144 
145 
146 TOTAL 
[ 
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AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A H I J K L 
PRICES AND SHADOW PRICES 
r- 8 PROOUCTS 9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANYL. 10 PTA/MQ Lire/MQ FF/MQ L/MQ M/MQ 
11 
12 CEREALS 
13 Wheat 26,48 27 22 24,80 o 70 19,98 
14 Barley 20,50 19 00 16,23 0,67 17,06 
15 Rye 21,96 18,83 15,89 0,48 16,34 
16 Oats 19,01 21 41 16 85 064 15,69 
17 Maize 22,92 19 62 16,37 o 41 17,29 
18 Rice 25,51 23 14 23 89 0,69 19 58 
19 Millet 19,24 19,78 17,92 0,51 14,43 
20 Sorghl.lll 15,77 16,21 14,77 o 42 11,90 
21 Tranqui llon 20 90 22 11 15,89 o 56 18,16 
22 Escanda 22,41 22,11 20 99 0,60 19,98 
23 Others 21,18 22,11 16,37 0,56 15,77 
24 
25 LEGUMES 
26 Chickpeas 60,97 29,75 57,10 1,62 46,00 
27 Broad beans 23,99 21,49 22,47 064 '8,10 
28 Beans 40,97 31,43 34,30 0,69 29,60 
29 Peas 33,56 34,78 34,30 0,69 25,14 
30 Lentils 30,51 29 91 28 57 o 48 23,02 
31 Carob beans 18 01 1799 16,87 o 48 13,59 
32 Lupin 18 68 14,18 17 49 o 50 14 09 
33 Alvejones 15,90 16 34 14,89 0,42 12 00 
34 Yeros 19,63 19,18 18 38 0,52 14,81 
35 Others 15 83 
36 
37 
38 VEGETABLES 
39 Potatoes 8,76 10 99 7,07 o 20 3,84 
40 Onions 9,21 9,47 o 49 
41 Garl ic 9,21 9 47 0,49 
42 Tomatoes 10,45 5,80 2,12 
43 Melons 12,89 9,48 
44 Cabbages 8 76 9,00 o 37 
45 Lettuce 14 10 14,49 
46 Peppers 17 61 18,10 
47 Cucunber 14 21 14,61 
48 Sweet potatoes 16,47 16,93 
49 Asparagus 43,37 44,58 
50 Green Beans 11,64 11 97 
51 Green Broad Beans 
52 Green Peas 
53 Carrots 4,10 4,21 
54 Artichokes 37,01 38,04 
55 Caul i fl ower 14,59 15 00 o 94 
56 Radish 6,68 6,87 
57 Spinach[ 58 Eggplant 
59 Celery etc. 11,58 11,90 
60 Forrage Beet 2,01 
61 Turni ps 3,56 
62 Vegt. NES 15 00 0,37 4,55 
63 Others 
64 
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A H I J K L 
65 
66 PRICES AND SHADOW PRICES 
67 PROOUCTS 
68 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
69 PTA/MQ Lire/MQ FF/MQ L/MQ M/MQ 
70 RAW MATERIALS 
71 Sugar Beet 3,48 2 63 2,69 0,11 2,14 
72 Groundnuts 38,82 34 40 30,71 o 79 24,06 
73 Hops 439,26 451 53 120,97 11 67 256,80 
74 Sugar Cane 3,10 3 19 2,90 0,08 2 34 
75 Esparto Grass 6 72 6 91 6 29 o 29 5 07 
76 Saffron 9084 00 9337 44 
n Tobacco 110 00 98 00 100,00 5 49 58,11 
78 Cotton 
79 Flax 166,64 112 73 134,56 4 09 47.06 
80 Heq, 94 47 110,76 134,56 173 47,06 
81 Wool 183 86 260 00 179,00 7,54 335,20 
82 Silk Cocoons 539,80 340 00 348,00 8,79 249,57 
83 Liquorice 53,83 55 33 50 11 1 42 40,37 
84 Others 
85 
86 FRUITS & NUTS 1,07 9,50 
87 Oranges 8,29 15.00 0,53 
88 Lemons 9,71 10 50 0,69 
89 Carobs 10,36 12 00 
90 Pomegranates 9 09 9.34 o 52 
91 Almonds 49 26 51 99 7 62 
92 Figs 10 25 8 96 0,50 
93 Hazelnuts 73 31 70 05 2 83 
94 Chestnuts 10,40 14 42 o 58 
95 Walnuts 31,89 50 03 2 02 
96 Strawberries 45 29 46 55 2 60 
97 PlllllS 12 55 24 96 1,11 
i' 
I. 
98 Cherries 
99 Apricots 
100 Pears 
15,28 
18 92 
10,15 
19.97 
43,19 
18.00 
2,30 
2 41 
1,08 
101 APOles 8,07 21 19 0,91 
102 Peaches 26,17 48.00 268 
103 Quinces 7,85 17 49 o 98 
104 Grapes 16,86 25 70 1,59 
105 Raisins 85 59 87.98 2 51 
106 Other Citrics 16 68 17 14 o 53 
107 India Figs 3,89 4 00 o 22 
108 Pistachio 583.68 600 00 33 48 
109 Bananas o 40 
110 Others 
111 
112 WINES 
113 Must (OOOHl) 17,64 40,26 22,12 o 91 45 18 
114 Subproducts 
115 Cider (OOOHl) 13,61 14,16 12 75 0,53 26 00 
116 
117 OLIVES 
118 Olive Oil (OOOHl) 9988 127 76 99 52 3.21 75 36 
119 Ol ives 20,13 35 00 28 05 o 65 15 19 
120 SUbproducts 
121 
122 
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51 
A H I J le L 
123 PRICES AND SHADOW PRICES 
124 PRODUCTS 
125 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
126 PTA/MQ Lire/MQ FF/MQ L/MQ M/MQ 
127 
128 PASTURE & FORESTR 0,19 
129 
130 MEAT &DAIRY PROD 
131 MEAT 
132 Beef &Veal 176,30 197,71 154,50 5,79 139,70 
133 Mutton &LanD 181,20 128,88 212,20 7 80 129,42 
134 Goatmeat 236,70 128,88 212,20 7 80 129,42 
135 Pigmeat 151 20 151,04 151,53 4.82 107 91 
136 Rabbitmeat 165,06 169,68 170,23 5,42 121,23 
137 Horsemeat 124,72 128,21 128,63 4 09 91 60 
138 
139 POULTRY & EGGS 
140 Poultrymeat 185,99 181 90 9 06 151 80 
141 Eggs 173,67 169,84 117,84 675 100 17 
142 
143 MILK 31,00 15 50 16,00 o 60 12,50 
144 Cow 31,00 15 50 16 00 0,60 12,50 
145 Sheep 36,00 26,49 18 58 0,70 14,50 
146 Goat 42,00 27 52 21,67 0,81 12,50 
147 
148 HONEY 220,00 
149 
150 HORSES(OOO) 468,82 481 93 439.08 31 31 353,75 
151 
152 Other Produce 96.00 
153 
154 
155 TOTAL 
[
l 
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52 
A AB AC AD AE AF 
6 
7 VALUE IN STERLING 
8 PRODUCTS 
9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
000 L 000 L 000 L 000 L 000 L 
11 
12 CEREALS 31638 41633 72491 22782 61858 
13 Wheat 21485 31833 52651 8838 23091 
14 Barley 3760 524 3977 9022 0 
15 Rye 2620 510 4693 88 31854 
16 Oats 538 0 7719 4833 3870 
17 Maize 1583 5281 1400 0 0 
18 Rice 1489 3410 0 0 0 
19 Millet 7 0 0 0 0 
Sorghlll1 2 0 0 0 0 
21 Tranquillon 93 0 525 0 978 
22 Escanda 60 0 0 0 2066 
23 Others 0 75 1527 0 0 
24 
25 LEGUMES 2845 2980 1723 1379 782 
26 Chickpeas 1288 506 0 0 0 
27 Broad beans 474 1474 0 0 0 
28 Beans 882 651 1723 819 59 
29 Peas 45 95 0 560 723 
Lentils 40 34 0 0 0 
31 Carob beans 61 13 0 0 0 
32 Lupin 28 168 0 0 0 
33 Alvejones 9 0 0 0 0 
34 Yeros 18 38 0 0 0 
35 Others 0 0 0 0 0 
36 
37 
38 VEGETABLES 22291 40941 14904 13891 48369 
39 Potatoes 4087 2811 14904 9273 34562 
Onions 0 549 0 0 0 
41 Garlic 0 0 0 0 0 
42 Tomatoes 6400 14379 0 0 0 
43 Melons 0 0 0 0 0 
44 Cabbages 0 3666 0 0 0 
45 Lettuce 0 0 0 0 0 
46 Peppers 0 0 0 0 0 
47 Cucl.ll'ber 0 0 0 0 0 
48 Sweet potatoes 0 0 0 0 0 
49 Asparagus 0 0 0 0 0 
Green Beans 0 0 0 0 0 
51 Green Broad Beans 0 0 0 0 0 
52 Green Peas 0 0 0 0 0 
53 Carrots 0 0 0 0 0 
54 Artichokes 0 0 0 0 0 
55 Caul iflower 0 0 0 0 0 
56 Radish 0 0 0 0 0 
57 Spinach 0 0 0 0 0 
58 Eggplant 0 0 0 0 0 
59 Celery etc. 0 0 0 0 0 
Forrage Beet 0 0 0 0 0 
61 Turnips 0 0 0 0 0 
62 Vegt. NES 0 0 0 4618 13807 
63 Others 0 0 0 0 0 
64 
65 
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53 
A AB AC AD AE AF 
66 
67 VALUE IN STERLING 
68 PROOUCTS 
69 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
70 
71 000 L 000 L 000 L 000 L 000 L 
n RAW MATERIALS 3907 10075 14451 6104 22575 
73 Sugar Beet 921 1614 7940 3 15953 
74 Groundnuts 99 99 411 0 755 
[~ 
LJ 
75 Hops 
76 Sugar Cane 
77 Esparto Grass 
0 
233 
321 
0 
0 
0 
434 
0 
0 
2101 
0 
0 
2230 
0 
0 
78 Saffron 0 0 0 0 0 
79 Tobacco 16 379 1153 0 1372 
80 Cotton 0 0 0 0 0 
81 Flax 35 113 1339 434 516 
82 Hef11) 130 1167 0 0 0 
r- 83 Wool 84 Silk Cocoons 85 Liquorice 
2082 
70 
0 
1538 
4952 
213 
2594 
580 
0 
3566 
0 
0 
1749 
0 
0 
86 Others 0 0 0 0 0 
87 
88 FRUITS & NUTS 23299 48135 47447 5037 19005 
89 Oranges 4434 1784 0 0 0 
90 Lemons 269 2552 0 0 0 
91 Carobs 0 0 0 0 0 
92 Pomegranates 155 0 0 0 0 
93 Almonds 7261 17951 0 0 0 
94 Figs 721 1238 0 0 0 
95 Hazelnuts 1 602 0 0 0 
96 Chestnuts 891 4002 0 0 0 
97 Walnuts 277 1050 0 0 0 
98 Strawberries 176 0 0 0 0 
99 Pll.JllS 300 674 0 0 0 
100 Cherries 387 1578 0 0 0 
101 Apricots 366 513 0 0 0 
102 Pears 690 2137 0 0 0 
103 Apples 1390 2568 0 0 0 
104 Peaches 514 6053 0 0 0 
105 Quinces 77 67 0 0 0 
106 Grapes 3142 3664 0 0 0 
107 Raisins 474 0 0 0 0 
108 Other Citrics 0 186 0 0 0 
109 India Figs 0 246 0 0 0 
110 Pistachio 0 536 0 0 0 
111 Bananas 0 0 0 0 0 
112 Others 0 0 0 0 0 
113 
114 WINES 13749 39118 56554 0 2208 
115 Must (OOOHl) 13749 39118 48187 0 2208 
116 Subproducts 0 0 0 0 0 
117 Cider (OOOHl) 0 0 8367 0 0 
118 
119 OLIVES 7398 8921 461 0 0 
120 Ol ive Oil (OOOHl) 7052 8792 0 0 0 
121 Olives 346 129 461 0 0 
122 SUbproducts 0 0 0 0 0 
123 
L 
P6gina 8 
54 
AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A AB AC AD AE AF 
124 VALUE IN STERLiNG 
125 PRODUCTS{' 126 
( 127. 
128 
129 PASTURE & FORESTR 
130 
131 MEAT &DAIRY PROD 
132 MEAT 
133 Beef &Vesl 
134 Mutton & LsJOO 
135 Gostmest 
136 Pigmest 
137 Rsbbitmest 
138 Horsen1est 
139 
140 POULTRY & EGGS 
141 Poultrvmest 
142 Eggs 
143 
144 MILK 
145 Cow 
146 SheeD 
147 Goat 
148 
149 HONEY 
150[ 151 HORSES(OOO) 
152 
153 Other Produce 
154 
155 
156 TOTAL 
157 
SPAIN 
000 L 
0 
21577 
6725 
4771 
1029 
9052 
0 
0 
7108 
0 
0 
5948 
. 4172 
216 
1560 
0 
0 
0 
139760 
ITALY 
000 L 
0 
33895 
14914 
5480 
0 
12342 
840 
319 
24852 
8236 
16616 
22202 
18542 
1964 
1696 
0 
1039 
0 
273791 
FRANCE 
000 L 
0 
86191 
51566 
9354 
0 
25271 
0 
0 
58207 
42051 
16156 
52914 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
405343 
Pagina 9 
U.K. 
000 L 
6777 
88395 
44598 
24197 
0 
19600 
0 
0 
12345 
3035 
9310 
48082 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2380 
0 
207180 
GERMANY 
000 L 
0 
157371 
61202 
4958 
1536 
89675 
0 
0 
23966 
8100 
15866 
137217 
129418 
0 
7799 
0 
0 
0 
473351 
55 
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AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A M N 0 P Q 
7 VALUE IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
8 PROOUCTS 
9 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
10 000 PTA 000 LIRE 000 FF 000 L 000 M 
11 
12 CEREALS 1207935 1635291 2426060 22782 1931418 
13 Wheat 808487 1231351 1855536 8838 655604 
14 Barley 114677 14801 96017 9022 0 
15 Rye 119309 19903 154610 88 1079175 
16 Oats 16063 0 204239 4833 95348 
17 Maize 88104 251554 55642 0 0 
18 Rice 55204 114682 0 0 0 
19 Mi llet 250 0 0 0 0 
20 Sorghun 88 0 0 0 0 
21 Tranquillon 3511 0 15016 0 31980 
22 Escanda 2241 0 0 0 69311 
23 Others 0 3000 45001 0 0 
24 
25 LEGUMES 127885 102298 85750 1379 28917 
26 Chickpeas 48471 9300 0 0 0 
27 Broad beans 17849 49698 0 0 0 
28 Beans 52442 29701 85750 819 2546 
29 Peas 2205 4800 0 560 26372 
30 Lentils 2563 2100 0 0 0 
31 Carob beans 2305 500 0 0 0 
32 Lupin 1054 4800 0 0 0 
33 Alvejones 326 0 0 0 0 
34 Yeros 671 1400 0 0 0 
35 Others 0 0 0 0 
36 
37 
38 VEGETABLES 451735 562839 532725 13891 842101 
39 Potatoes 180982 156201 532725 9273 670975 
40 Onions 30095 10595 0 0 0 
41 Garl ic 9210 0 0 0 0 
42 Tomatoes 31538 39329 0 0 0 
43 Melons 32057 16700 0 0 0 
44 Cabbages 67355 . 88142 0 0 0 
45 Lettuce 21872 0 0 0 0 
46 PePDers 24038 0 0 0 0 
47 Cucunber 4476 0 0 0 0 
48 Sweet potatoes 9702 0 0 0 
49 Asparagus 1941 3700 0 0 0 
50 Green Beans 18000 0 0 0 
51 Green Broad Beans 0 0 0 0 
52 Green Peas 0 0 0 0 
53 Carrots 508 0 0 0 0 
54 Artichokes 7638 27697 0 0 0 
55 Caul iflower 10018 0 0 0 0 
56 Radi sh 128 0 0 0 0 
57 Spinach 4907 0 0 0 0 
58 Eggplant 4747 0 0 0 0 
59 Celery etc. 9712 10898 0 0 0 
60 Forrage Beet 0 0 0 0 0 
61 Turnips 0 0 0 0 0 
62 Vegt. NES 71577 0 4618 171126 
63 Others 812 120000 0 0 0 
64 
65 
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AGRICULTURAL FINAL OUTPUT IN WESTERN EUROPE, c. 1910 
A .. M 0 P Q 
66 
67 VALUE IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
68 PROOUCTS 
69 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
70 
71 000 PTA 000 LIRE 000 FF 000 L 000 M 
72 RAW MATERIALS 131822 455571 370961 6104 491463 
73 Sugar Beet 30144 39923 200916 3 321165 
74 Groundnuts 4891 4300 16000 0 23025 
75 Hops 0 4500 2101 49049 
76 Sugar Cane 8767 0 0 0 0 
77 Esparto Grass 7372 0 0 0 0 
78 Saffron 12854 0 0 0 0 
79 Tobacco 330 6762 21000 0 14528 
80 Cotton 0 0 0 0 
81 Flax 1430 3100 44001 434 5930 
82 H~ 7094 74597 0 0 0 
83 Wool 50784 53040 61576 3566 77766 
84 Silk Cocoons 4289 191549 22968 0 0 
85 Liquorice 414 8300 0 0 0 
86 Others 3454 74000 0 0 0 
87 
88 FRUITS &NUTS 263470 707792 1280000 5037 169385 
89 Oranges 68973 50205 0 0 0 
90 Lemons 3806 39102 0 0 0 
91 Carobs 0 6600 0 0 0 
92 Pomegranates 2700 0 0 0 0 
93 Almonds 46945 122488 0 0 0 
94 Figs 14791 22194 0 0 0 
95 Hazelnuts 13 14900 0 0 0 
96 Chestnuts 15974 99498 0 0 0 
97 Walnuts 4369 26001 0 0 0 
98 Strawberries 3066 0 0 0 0 
99 Pll.lllS 3401 15201 0 0 0 
100 Cherri es 2567 13699 0 0 0 
101 Apricots 2876 9199 0 0 0 
102 Pears 6496 35705 0 0 0 
103 Apples 12371 60010 0 0 0 
104 Peaches 5025 108480 0 0 0 
105 Quinces 616 1200 0 0 0 
106 Grapes 33248 59110 0 0 0 
107 Raisins 16177 0 0 0 0 
108 Other Citrics 6000 0 0 0 
109 India Figs 4400 0 0 0 
110 Pistachio 9600 0 0 0 
111 Bananas 10165 0 0 0 
112 Others 9892 4200 0 0 0 
113 
114 WINES 265694 1757942 1370440 0 109290 
115 Must (OOOHl) 265694 1725342 1167715 0 109290 
r 
L. 
116 Subproducts 
117 Cider (OOOHl) 
118 
0 
0 
32600 
0 
0 
202725 
0 
0 
0 
0 
119 OLIVES 230206 356900 20000 0 0 
120 Ol ive 0; l (OOOHl) 219436 349900 0 0 0 
121 Olives 10770 7000 20000 0 0 
122 Subproducts 0 0 0 
123 
), 
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A M N 0 P Q 
124 VALUE IN NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
125 PROOUCTS 
126 SPAIN ITALY FRANCE U.K. GERMANY 
127 000 PTA 000 LIRE 000 FF 000 L 000 M 
128 
129 PASTURE &FORESTR 0 0 0 6m 0 
130 
131 MEAT &DAIRY PROD 
132 MEAT 669329 1022913 2425252 88395 3591614 
133 Beef &Veal 204861 509499 1376595 44598 1477328 
134 Mutton &LanD 110894 90603 254640 24197 82311 
135 Goatmeat 31244 0 0 25496 
136 Pigmeat 283802 386511 794017 19600 2006479 
137 Rabbitmeat 38527 26300 0 0 0 
138 Horsemeat 10000 0 0 0 
139 
140 POULTRY &EGGS 182844 583347 1016000 12345 371109 
141 Poultrymeat 165347 734000 3035 135709 
142 Eggs 418000 282000 9310 235400 
143 
144 MILK 306668 609745 1408000 48082 2810051 
145 Cow 215078 477958 0 0 2690388 
146 Sheep 11160 74490 0 0 0 
147 Goat 80430 57297 0 0 119663 
148 
149 HONEY 4522 3500 0 0 36520 
150 
151 HORSES(OOO) 0 16000 0 2380 0 
152 
153 Other Produce 0 22200 0 0 0 
154 
155 
156 TOTAL 3842110 7836339 10935188 207180 10381868 
157 
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